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1 
ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
The District Court Erred When It Granted Fenton’s Suppression Motion Because The 
Valid Probation Search Of Fenton’s Vehicle Was Attenuated From His Illegal Detention 
 
Officer Stormes pulled over Fenton on the mistaken belief that Fenton’s vehicle 
lacked proper registration, based on a misreading of Fenton’s license plate. 
(R., pp.102-03.)  During the resulting detention, Fenton volunteered that he was on 
probation and Officer Stormes, consistent with standard procedures, contacted Fenton’s 
probation officer to explain the situation.  (8/4/2016 Tr., p.24, L.19 – p.26, L.23.)  The 
probation officer asked Officer Stormes to detain Fenton until she could arrive and 
conduct (based on the terms and conditions of Fenton’s probation) a probation search 
of Fenton’s vehicle.  (Id., p.26, L.25 – p.27, L.25.)  Before the search could take place, 
however, Fenton fled the scene on foot.  (Id., p.28, L.11 – p.29, L.3.)  While he was 
being apprehended, officers conducted the probation search of Fenton’s car and 
discovered methamphetamine.  (Id., p.29, Ls.4-20.)  The district court suppressed that 
evidence, holding, “[i]n this case, but for the officer’s error, the Defendant’s vehicle 
would not have been stopped, and the probation officer would not have been 
contacted—thus a search would not have occurred.”  (R., p.179.)  This was error. 
As articulated by the United States Supreme Court, while the exclusionary rule 
applies to evidence acquired as a result of a Fourth Amendment violation, “exclusion 
may not be premised on the mere fact that a constitutional violation was a ‘but-for’ 
cause of obtaining evidence.”  Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 592 (2006).  
Evidence is not “fruit of the poisonous tree simply because it would not have come to 
light but for the illegal actions of police.”  Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 
487-88 (1963).  Rather, the question is whether police obtained the evidence “by 
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exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged 
of the primary taint.”  Id. at 488 (quotation omitted).  
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized at least three exceptions to the 
exclusionary rule, which include the independent source, inevitable discovery, and 
attenuated basis doctrines.  State v. Stuart, 136 Idaho 490, 496-98, 36 P.3d 1278, 
1284-86 (2001).  To determine whether unlawful police conduct has been adequately 
attenuated, the Court has adopted a three-factor test, reviewing “(1) the elapsed time 
between the misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence, (2) the occurrence of 
intervening circumstances, and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of the improper law 
enforcement action.”  State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 846, 103 P.3d 454, 459 (2004) 
(citation omitted); see also Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975).  As explained 
in the state’s opening brief, no one factor is dispositive and not all must be resolved in 
favor of the state before the doctrine of attenuation becomes applicable.  See State v. 
Schrecengost, 134 Idaho 547, 549, 6 P.3d 403, 405 (Ct. App. 2000).  “The test only 
requires a balancing of the relative weights of all the factors, viewed together, in order to 
determine if the police exploited an illegality to discover evidence.”  Id. (citing United 
States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 549-550 (4th Cir. 1998)). 
The doctrine of attenuation applies to this case because, assuming that Fenton’s 
initial detention was unlawful, balancing the relevant factors shows that officers did not 
exploit that detention to discover evidence.  As set forth in the state’s opening brief, the 
temporal proximity in this case, which was more remote than that in either Utah v. 
Strieff, 136 S.Ct. 2056 (2016), or Page, supra, should be accorded little (if any) weight 
toward suppression.  At the time the evidence was discovered, Fenton was no longer 
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being detained for the traffic investigation; he was being detained at his probation 
officer’s request.  Second, the numerous intervening circumstances in this case strongly 
favor attenuation.  These circumstances include Fenton volunteering that he was on 
probation (8/4/2016 Tr., p.24, Ls.16-25); the probation officer, after learning of the two 
officers’ observations of potential drug activity (which occurred prior to any traffic stop), 
asking for Fenton to be detained and choosing to search Fenton’s vehicle, consistent 
with the terms and conditions of Fenton’s probation (id., p.25, L.12 – p.27, L.25); and 
Fenton’s flight as officers began to conduct the probation search of his vehicle (id., p.28, 
L.11 – p.29, L.3).  Third, Officer Stormes did not flagrantly abuse his authority; he 
misread Fenton’s license plate.  The lack of flagrancy in the officer’s conduct also 
strongly favors attenuation. 
In his respondent’s brief, Fenton argues that, notwithstanding the considerable 
time that passed between the completion of the initial detention and the evidence that 
was discovered during the subsequent probation search, the temporal proximity in this 
case “strongly favors suppression.”  (Respondent’s brief, p.12.)  It does not.  While the 
state has never argued that temporal proximity, by itself, favors attenuation in this case, 
it must be more favorable to attenuation than the much shorter time-lapse in Streiff.  
And in that case the Supreme Court found merely that the temporal proximity “favor[ed] 
suppressing the evidence,” and not “strongly.”  Streiff, 136 S.Ct. at 2062.  Fenton also 
argues that Officer Stormes’ miscommunication with dispatch, resulting in the 
misidentification of Fenton’s license plate, is the equivalent of flagrant, systemic, or 
recurrent police conduct that would favor suppression.  (Respondent’s brief, p.13.)  
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Contrary to Fenton’s argument, misreading a license plate does not show a flagrant 
abuse of police authority.   
Fenton, however, focuses his argument on the intervening circumstances prong.  
(Respondent’s brief, pp.6-12.)  Fenton asserts that “Officer Stormes’ discovery that [he] 
was on probation is not the same as an officer’s discovery that a warrant exists” and 
claims that the state is seeking to expand the attenuation doctrine beyond the discovery 
of arrest warrants.  (Id.)  But the discovery of arrest warrants is not the only intervening 
circumstance recognized by the Court.  On the contrary, Streiff is itself an expansion of 
intervening circumstances to the discovery of arrest warrants from the defendant’s 
voluntary acts.  See Streiff, 136 S.Ct. at 2060-62.  As explained by the Supreme Court 
in that case, the issue is simply whether “the connection between the unconstitutional 
police conduct and the evidence … has been interrupted by some intervening 
circumstance,” not whether it was interrupted by the discovery of an arrest warrant.  Id. 
at 2061 (emphasis added). 
In addition to arrest warrants, appellate courts (including the United States 
Supreme Court) have found several other circumstances to be “intervening” for 
purposes of an attenuation analysis.  Examples of other intervening circumstances 
include voluntary confessions following illegal detentions, see Brown, supra, or 
voluntary confessions given after Miranda1 warnings where an earlier confession was 
obtained before Miranda warnings, see Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314 (1985), a 
lawful arrest following the flight or resistance of the defendant, see United States v. 
Nooks, 446 F.2d 1283, 1288 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Dawdy, 46 F.3d 1427, 
                                            
1  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
5 
1431 (8th Cir. 1995), and voluntary acts by third-parties, such as a witness’s decision to 
testify, though that witness would have been unknown but for unlawful police conduct, 
see United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 280 (1978), a third-party incidentally 
identifying the defendant during an illegal detention as a suspect in another crime, see 
Mosby v. Senkowski, 470 F.3d 515, 522-23 (2d Cir. 2006), or the defendant’s 
interaction with a third-party agent or agency that had no involvement in the initial 
Fourth Amendment violation, see United States v. Yorgensen, 845 F.3d 908, 914-15 
(8th Cir. 2017).   
Moreover, Fenton acknowledges (albeit in a footnote) that at least one appellate 
court has held, in a case where the officer detained the defendant based on a perceived 
traffic violation, that the defendant’s probationary status was a sufficient intervening 
circumstance to trigger application of the attenuation doctrine.  See People v. Durant, 
205 Cal. App. 4th 57, 64-66 (2012).  And though a separate California appellate court 
took a different approach in a case where the officer “purposefully” pulled over a car—
without suspicion of any wrongdoing, merely hoping that the defendant would be in the 
car, see People v. Bates, 222 Cal. App. 4th 60, 70-71 (2013), that case is no more 
persuasive than Durant.  Rather, under the specific facts of this case, including the 
officer’s mistaken perception of a traffic violation, the court’s analysis in Durant is far 
more relevant. 
Finally, Fenton notes that “the probationary search at issue here was conducted 
at the discretion of a third person, the probation officer.”  (Respondent’s brief, p.6.)  This 
is correct and, as shown above, it is a factor that significantly favors attenuation.  See 
Yorgensen, 845 F.3d at 914-15.  The probation officer had the discretion to demand 
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access to Fenton’s vehicle and to search that vehicle at any time.  (R., pp.98-99.)  The 
probation officer did not have to wait until Fenton was detained or in custody to exercise 
that discretion.  That Fenton had been (at least arguably) unlawfully detained was 
incidental to the probation officer’s decision to search Fenton’s vehicle.  Because the 
probation officer—a third-party with no connection to any unlawful police conduct—
chose to search Fenton’s vehicle, and that search was based on Fenton’s consent 
under the terms of his probation and not on Officer Stormes’ traffic investigation, there 
was no exploitation of the initial detention. 
The balance of the relevant factors strongly favors attenuation.  Officer Stormes’ 
mistaken belief that Fenton’s registration was invalid, even if not reasonable, was also 
not flagrant.  And no evidence was discovered until there had been several intervening 
circumstances, including voluntary actions by Fenton in informing the officer of his 
probationary status and his later flight, and decisions by the third-party probation officer 
who had no involvement in the initial detention.  The probation search in this case was 
valid because the probation officer did not exploit any primary illegality.  That probation 
search resulted in the discovery of the evidence Fenton sought to suppress.  Because 
the evidence was acquired during the valid probation search, the district court erred 
when it granted Fenton’s suppression motion. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s 
erroneous order granting Fenton’s suppression motion and that it remand this case for 
further proceedings. 
 DATED this 31st day of May, 2017. 
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